On Democracy and the Overman
The present potential of man is upon a rope tied
between servitude and freedom or individuality and utter baseness. The rise of
equality as the preeminent characteristic of the contemporary age has put man
in this current trajectory as Nietzsche and Tocqueville argue. How to save man
from the worst outcomes of the rise of equality is where these two authors
radically diverge from one another. For Tocqueville, the rise of equality and
the equality of conditions is tantamount for the foundation of a (liberal)
democracy but it is also the outcomes caused by this equality that temper,
hinder, compose, and ruin a democracy if a balance is not kept or man does not
heed Tocqueville’s warning. Nietzsche however sees the outcome of the equality
of conditions to bring about a feeble and unhistorical breed of man; the
solution he proposes is not quite the refinement of democracy as Tocqueville
advocates but an alternative: a different perspective on the usage of history
for life and the overman.
Democracy, best exemplified in America (i.e., the
United States), in Tocqueville’s Democracy
in America is made possible by the generative fact that is the equality of
conditions (Tocqueville 3). The equality of conditions—being a generative
fact—then influences the course of society as Tocqueville found that it was the
central point at which all his observations came to an end (Tocqueville 3).
This generative fact was the result of, in a sense, the trajectory of history
as Tocqueville argues. Nations like France were divided among few families and
could govern those that lived on their possessed land. The sole manner of which
this power and capability to rule was transferred by inheritance. Those that
were not born in the ruling families also had one action available to them to
be given this power and landed property and that is by force. The clergy
however opened itself to all man, rich and poor. As Tocqueville sees it,
“equality begins to penetrate” or, that is, originates from within the church
and influences the governments ruled by the noble families as some of the
clergy found themselves to “take a seat above kings” (Tocqueville 4). As time
continues, society becomes more civilized and stable and there are more roles
to be played by man as relationships between man grow in number and
complication; during the growth of these new roles, “kings ruin themselves” and
nobles too ruin themselves with their private wars, thus allowing for those
whose potentials were pent by nobles and kings to take new roles in society and
gain both influence and wealth (Tocqueville 4). Further, this encroaching
towards the modern equality of conditions is pushed by the enlightenment of
man. Literature and the arts become prevalent within society and the mind
“becomes an element of success; science is a means of government, intelligence
a social force” (Tocqueville 4). New routes of power become available to man in
contrast to the two methods in times previous: inheritance or force. Now all
previous historical developments hitherto have served as a leveler for humanity
and a general equality has been brought about and since it would seem the last
700 years of French history have all profited equality, Tocqueville claims that
Providence itself has brought about equality; for the “gradual development of
equality of conditions is providential fact and all events and man serve its
development” (Tocqueville 6). The Protestantism of Europe especially has fueled
a democratic spirit and the revolution “continuing in all the Christian
universe” (Tocqueville 6). Towards where this gradual development of equality
of conditions will bring the Christian West is not definite— “no one can
say”—but democratic nations will be “less brilliant, less glorious, less
strong” but more peaceful and scornful of authority (Tocqueville 6-9). The results of
this change in power from the few to the whole of a society are pervasive and
have never been seen before.
One outcome Tocqueville highlights can be a problem
for those with specific tastes. If one wants give man loftiness to the human
spirit, inspire them to contempt material goods, maintain conviction and
devotion, polish mores, make and enjoy poetry, renown, and glory, and undertake
great ambitions, then they ought not to reside in a democratic society; if
however one wants to devote their intellect and moral activity towards the
material life and would rather focus on peaceful habits instead of heroic virtues,
then one need not look further than a democratic regime (Tocqueville
234-235). This furthers what Nietzsche
takes problem with the modern world and the outcomes of democracy. For him,
these outcomes bring about a contemptible sheepish breed of man with small
souls. Even Tocqueville notes how men of democracies shy away from great
ambitions and compel the soul in its entirety in doing mediocre things (Tocqueville
601). All Americans, he observes, are “devoured” by the desire to rise but none of them want to “nourish” vast hopes or aim high but they are in
constant want to acquire material “goods, reputation, [and] power” (Tocqueville
599). Before the times of the equality of conditions when there was inequality
and misery, one could still observe “souls” that were not “degraded” as they
are now (Tocqueville 8). There are however more outcomes apart from the
degradation of the soul.
For instance, democratic peoples love equality at all
times and sometimes this love of equality comes at the expense of freedom (Tocqueville
481). The love of this equality stems from the aversion of anyone having more
tyrannical power over one another and once equality is established in civil
society one is given the right to indulge in the same pleasures, enter the same
professions, and meet in the same places as any other citizen can (Tocqueville
479). Man, however, cannot be entirely equal and free at the same time Tocqueville
argues (Tocqueville 481-482). Further, this love of equality turns man towards
himself, an individual, and thus individualism flourishes, for individualism is
of democratic origin. He is confined “wholly in the solitude of his own heart”
(Tocqueville 484). Individualism first “dries up” the only source of public
virtues and, in the long term, destroys the other virtues and man will be
utterly absorbed in selfishness (Tocqueville 483). The counterbalances to this
individualism, Tocqueville observes, are the free institutions. Despotism is at
its strongest when man is isolated in their individual ways and does what it
can to keep man isolated; equality, too, places man besides one another
“without a common bond” and thus isolates one from another (Tocqueville 485). The
free institutions within America have those who would otherwise be focused on
themselves towards one another and for the public good despite their
individualistic instincts. This ties into Tocqueville’s observation of what use
the Americans make association in civil life. Since democratic peoples are
“independent and weak, they can do almost nothing by themselves” (Tocqueville
490). This condition the democratic people have given rise to both institutions
and associations that prevents their individualistic ways from being encroached
upon by despotism. Nonetheless, there is a kind of despotism that democratic
nations have a right to fear.
After some centuries of enlightenment, Tocqueville
states, it would seem possible for a despotism to be established (Tocqueville
662). It will however be one not seen before: one more extensive, milder, and
“degrade” man without physical harm (Tocqueville 662). This kind of despotism
stems from the tyranny of the majority—both an inherent danger and spawn of
democracy—and Tocqueville expresses much concern over the possibility of it
ever taking root in America. For the “moral empire of the majority” is based on
the idea that there is more enlightenment and wisdom in the majority than there
is of one man alone; a democracy caters and operates more so in the favor of
the majority (Tocqueville 236). So, this new kind of despotism is not far
removed from a democratic nation but it must be fought against if one like Tocqueville
favors the balanced democracy without a tyrannical majority. One manner of
which to combat this new kind of despotism is to create national representation
and diminish the “evil” that extreme centralization can produce or else the
spirit is extinguished and all man is servile (Tocqueville 664-665). Man then would lose their faculty of
thinking, acting for themselves, and fall below a level of humanity (Tocqueville
665). With this, Tocqueville departs with the sober warning against this new
kind of despotism that would turn men to sheep or, as Nietzsche would call this
new breed of sheepish men: the last man.
“All beings so
far have created something beyond themselves,” Nietzsche’s Zarathustra states
(Kaufmann 124). At best the modern age, defined namely by democracy and the
quality of conditions, cannot create anything more than furthering of
democracy. For Tocqueville, the humanity of a democratic people is only lowered
once the new kind of despotism takes hold of its society. Nietzsche, in
response, takes advantage of the observations from Tocqueville relating to how
democratic nations will bring about “less brilliance” than within an
aristocracy, “sciences less great”, and, essentially, a homogenizing of man
into a moderate state (Tocqueville 9). The result of this is the
“popularization”, “feminization,” and “infantization” of science as well as a
weakened personality; further coupled with how history is often taught as being
“it was” instead of how it can be now and an unhistorical man is spawned (Preuss
42, 28, 9). Much like the degraded spirit of a democratic people, the
unhistorical person focuses on the material present and no longer seeks answers
to questions such as “what is love? What is longing? What is a star?”; when
confronted with such a question, they blink and claim they have invented
happiness (Kaufmann 129). In this sense, men like the last man and the audience
Zarathustra preached to in vain are dead. They are not the ones that go under
in order to cross over the rope or man and not the men that Zarathustra loves.
This being so, Zarathustra or, rather, Nietzsche decides to search for living
companions: those that he is able to lure away from the herd (Kaufmann 135). To
them he will preach the overman and the importance of the advantage and
disadvantage of history for life.
On the Advantage
and Disadvantage of History for Life,
serves as a critical kind of history. Critical history is in the “service of
life” and is used sometimes to “shatter” and “dissolve” something to enable one
to live (Preuss 21). It is important to note that life is nearly synonymous
with creativity, love of his virtue, has not too many virtues, holds his spirit
back not, justifies the future, redeems the past generations, has a deep soul,
and so on (Kaufmann 127-128). The unhistorical man is too forgetful and too
dead; and the historical man is too much like the true pupil Heraclitus and
hardly dares to lift a finger (Preuss 9). To be the kind of man that
Zarathustra loves, one must be able to act and all acting requires forgetting,
for there is a degree of “insomnia” of historical sense that would injury every
living thing and finally destroys life (Preuss 10). So, Nietzsche’s critique
focuses on how man must balance both their historical and unhistorical senses.
Learning history as we do now, he critiques, as indigestible knowledge stones
does man no good and leaves him in struggle, suffering, boredom and a “never to
be completed imperfect tense” (Preuss 24, 9). Consider this, Nietzsche tells
us, the unhistorical and historical sense are both necessary for the health of
an individual, people, and culture (Preuss 10). The “vanity” of the historian
parades his indifference towards history as objectivity and this is harmful for
the individual and culture; instead, use the standpoint you are given so to
interpret the past and preserve the noblest qualities found in the past through
your own examination of history. Interpret the past and bring what you like
into the present. Be remembered as one who fought against his time and satisfy
your souls on Plutarch and his heroes— “dare to believe in yourself when you
believe in his heroes” (Preuss38). The excess of the phrase memento mori from mediaeval Christianity
has held its grip on modernity for too long when instead one must rather heed
the phrase memento vivere, Nietzsche
continues (Preuss 44-45).
Now as to who between Tocqueville and Nietzsche has
the best treatment of democracy, it would be Tocqueville, for Tocqueville
accepts democracy and his book serves to be a guide for democratic people.
Nietzsche, on the other hand, preaches sentiments that are rather
anti-democratic such as contempt towards last man, overcoming man, and the
wanting to asks questions with no answer. This is not to say that one or the
other is wrong but that one treats democracy well. Nietzsche’s preaching
towards the overman, in a sense, only serves to attract straying sheep from the
democratic herd with small souls; Tocqueville only observes the outcomes and
causes of the democratic revolution and attempts to defend it from itself as
the reactants and products of democracy both hinder and temper it. The equality
of conditions slowly birthed by all previous historical events are in the favor
of the modern era and the natural result is democracy and all the outcomes
aforementioned.
Works Cited
Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. Ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2000. Print.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life. Ed. Peter
Preuss. Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 1980. Print.
Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Portable Nietzsche. Ed. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Viking
Penguin Inc., 1968. Print.
Art: Eugène Delacroix (1798-1863) La liberté guidant le peuple (1830)
