Recovered Memory
Review
Stemming
largely from the 1990s (Colangelo, 2009), recovered, suppressed, and repressed
memory phenomenon has been the grounds for heated debates among scientists and
scholars. Coined the “memory wars” (Rubin & Boals, 2010; McNally &
Geraerts, 2009), Freud is often credited with beginning the psychological
concept of repressed memories that can resurface at some other time (Colangelo,
2009). However, research in the last thirty years have challenged,
particularly, the accuracy of these recovered memories. With research into
imagination inflation and the ability to instill false memories in people,
there has been further controversy over the phenomena. Clinicians or practitioners
especially have been the focal point in this debate because clinicians,
psychotherapists, and the likes are more likely to incur recovered memories in
patients and believe in the validity of recovered memories with 43 per cent of
clinical psychologists believing memories can be recovered accurately (Brewin &
Andrews, 2017; McNally, 2016). This is the science-practice gap suggesting
clinicians are less informed than researchers (Brewin & Andrews, 2017).
Key
terms used in the discussion of memory recovery include memory suppression and
repression. Memory suppression involves the conscious avoidance of recalling a
particular memory (Oulton, Strange & Takarangi, 2016). Memory repression is
the Freudian mechanism of the unconscious (involuntary) avoidance of (usually)
harmful or traumatic experiences. Other key terms include dissociation wherein
a memory is hidden in another stream of consciousness (Colangelo, 2009) which
is associated with the repressed memory interpretation and false feedback which
is often a strategy employed in imagination inflation studies; false feedback
involves giving participants generic false information while suggesting they
experienced an event that never occurred (Brewin & Andrews, 2017). Recent
research suggests that memories can be recovered but their accuracy or veracity
varies (McNally & Geraerts, 2009; Brewin & Andrews, 2016; Geraerts et
al., 2009; Oulton, Strange & Takarangi, 2016).
The
two major interpretations of recovered memories are also the major two factions
that are clashing over recovered memory phenomena. All factions usually study
the phenomena by using studies pertaining to participants that claim to have
suffered from childhood sexual abuse or sorts of amnesia. One faction uses some
variation of the false memory interpretation that suggests “recovered memories
of abuse do not correspond to real events” (McNally & Geraerts, 2009).
Further, this interpretation argues that traumatic events such as childhood
sexual abuse ought to be remembered better and not less. So, they are skeptical
of reports of memories of abuse that surface years later. However, cases of
individuals recovering memories that were forgotten have been documented and
the false memory interpretation does not include individuals that have
suppressed their traumatic memories to where they eventually forget they
happened (Colangelo, 2009). Another faction uses the repression interpretation
which suggests that a traumatic event can be forgotten for a period of time. A
therapist may also be able to help a patient remember a memory according to
this interpretation (McNally, 2016). A third interpretation is detailed by
McNally and Geraerts (2009) that suggests: childhood sexual abuse was not
experienced as trauma, suppression, lack of retrieval cues, and forgetting are
associated with recovered memories of abuse. The third interpretation seems the
most likely in the average case.
Repression
Given
the amount of research into the recovered memory phenomena thus far, evidence
for the memory repression mechanism has been inadequate largely due to its low
capability in being tested in experiments (McNally & Geraerts, 2009). More
recent studies into memory repression use the word “dissociation” in the place
of repression. Dissociation is theoretically similar and often tied to Freud’s
concept of repression. Both are often mentioned as possible explanations for
forgetting and remembering past events (Colangelo, 2009). As in Kikuchi et al.,
(2009)’s study, dissociative amnesia prevents the patient from having the
ability to retrieve certain memories. It is theorized, like with Freud’s memory
repression, that dissociative amnesia is caused shortly after a traumatic event
in order to manage the trauma. Further, Kikuchi et al., (2009) found that there
is increased activity in the prefrontal cortex and decreased activity in the
hippocampus with their subjects that were reported to have dissociative amnesia.
Decreased activity in the hippocampus suggests that memory retrieval is
inhibited (Anderson & Levy, 2009). Kikuchi et al., (2009) conclude that memory
repression in dissociative amnesia is linked with an altered pattern of neural
activity as their experiment demonstrated. However, no causal relationships
could have been drawn from the heightened activity in the prefrontal cortex and
the decreased activity in the hippocampus.
Suppression.
Research
has been increasingly focused towards finding other mechanisms of forgetting, suppression,
and the creating of false memories. For example, Benoit and Anderson (2012) use
a four-phase modified Think/NoThink procedure to find two neural mechanisms
associated with suppression and memory substitution. Oulten, Strange, and
Takarangi (2016) with a between-subjects design divided participants into three
groups: suppression, monitoring-only, and control. The participants were asked
to watch a multi-fatality car accident. Across conditions, participants were
found to have intrusive memories of the video they were asked to watch; but
suppressing memories of the multi-fatality accident did not produce a rebound
effect amplifying the memory. Memory recall of the traumatic video produced
some inaccuracies. Abadie and Camos (2018) had participants remember words from
an associatively high or low similar list. Their experiment demonstrated how
false memories are not produced in the working memory because of working memory
maintenance, but when the working memory maintenance mechanism is removed, then
false memories begin to appear in both immediate and delayed recognition tests.
Anderson and Levy (2009), using a modified procedural model of a go/no-go task,
demonstrated that participants can control their intrusive memories by stopping
memory retrieval. The stopping of conscious recollection was signified by the
decreasing of activity in the hippocampus while emotionally negative memories stopped
were signified by decreased activity in the hippocampus and amygdala.
Recovered
memories of childhood sexual abuse are possible. Some victims do go through a
period of time in which they do not consciously remember the incidents (Colangelo,
2009). 14 of 27 subjects had reported deliberately not thinking of their
childhood sexual abuse (McNally & Geraerts, 2009). The period of time in
which they do not consciously remember the incidents, however, are not exactly
repressed memories, because repressed memories are supposed to be inaccessible
to recall. The 14 of 27 subjects were able to access the recollection but
consciously suppressed the memories. There seems to be a lot of room for a
study to attempt an answer of how long someone who as experienced childhood
sexual abuse suppresses their memory of it. Such an answer would tie well with
Geraerts et al., (2009)’s study that found that those who spontaneously recover
memories of childhood sexual abuse tend to show an enhanced ability to suppress
unwanted thoughts. Such suppression seems to inhibit their access to long-term
memories.
Magical ideation.
As pointed out by McNally (2016),
patients that tend to report recovered memories score high on measures of
magical ideation and absorption. Finkelstein (2017) in his literature review,
however, cited studies that are in direct contradiction to McNally’s findings.
Further research into correlations of magical ideation, absorption, and recovered
memories would be profitable.
Imagination inflation
and false memories.
The participants of Sharman and
Scoboria (2009)’s experiment demonstrated that imagination inflation occurs
regardless of an event’s plausibility. Participants were more confident that
they experienced events that did not occur but were moderately and lowly plausible.
This likely goes against what one would normally predict and is in
contradiction to another similar study cited in the journal’s discussion.
Further, participants were found to have clearer and more complete memories of
higher plausibility followed by moderate and lower plausible memories regardless
of whether the memory was imagined or not. These findings can be problematic if
a patient who has not experienced, say, childhood sexual abuse somehow begins
to imagine that they have and proceeds to see a therapist for help. Recovered
memories can first occur outside of therapy and a therapist may guide that
patient toward believing in that false memory even more without suggesting that
spontaneously recovered memories can be false (Brewin & Andrews 2017).
However, the probability for a therapist to instill false memories within a
patient may not be common as it is difficult (Brewin & Andrews, 2016).
Brewin and Andrews (2016) give three scenarios by which a therapist or trusted
person may increase the possible emergence of false memories: a belief that is
strengthened in plausibility by a trusted figure, recollective experience
encouraged by guiding imagery, and confidence in the memory’s veracity.
Conclusion.
The
mechanisms responsible for remembering anything are not wholly understood yet.
There are a numerous number of conceptualizations of how we recall objects and
concepts. In recovering memories of childhood sexual abuse, to apply that
memory in order to accuse a particular person, one would likely have to be able
to recall whom was responsible. If a person were to suppress the memory of
being abused, then it is also possible that there are inaccuracies in the
recollection as suppression has been found to encourage inaccuracies (Oulton,
Strange, & Takarangi, 2016). Suppose then, that an individual is having
difficulty in recalling the name or face of their abuser. Person recognition could work similar to the serial or parallel
model of recognition. The serial model requires first that a face must activate
a face recognition unit within in the brain before biographical information
become available (Robinson-Riegler, 2012). Parallel processing in the
interactive activation and competition model includes the requirement of face
activation units, semantic information units, and person identity nodes all being
parallel processes of one another (Robinson-Riegler, 2012). Aside from the
possible models, cued recall and priming aids in retrieving long-term memories.
Those who have suppressed their memories demonstrate a difficulty in retrieving
long-term memories (Geraerts et al., 2009). Combining a suppressed memory with
a lack of retrieval cues may make it difficult to recall and easy to forget the
abuse after so many years until a cue or involuntary episodic memory reminds
the individual of their suppressed memory of abuse.
The
third interpretation offered by McNally and Geraerts (2009) that suppression,
lack of retrieval cues, and the abuse not having been experienced as trauma
more aptly explains why and how memories of abuse can be recovered later in
life. The false memory interpretation claims that it is unlikely recovered
memories of abuse are true on the basis that such a strong experience should strengthen
that memory. Neither suppression and its ability to dampen accuracy in
recovered memories, nor is the interpretation of (dissociative) amnesia
included under the false memory interpretation. To the benefit of the false
memory interpretation however, the use of guided imagery, therapist, imagination
inflation, false feedback, and the likes can encourage a patient to recover a
memory that never occurred. However, implanting false memories in someone is
not easy, and, by extension, likely not common among therapists. In research
settings, implanting false memories also requires deception on some level such
as using edited photos (Brewin & Andrews, 2017). Further, as noted by
Brewin and Andrews (2017), no study has yet attempted a repeated implantation
of false memories of childhood sexual abuse. Repeated events of childhood
sexual abuse are often reported in abuse allegations. Additionally, to the
benefit of the false memory interpretation, accuracy is, however, a problem
with recovered memories, but the recovered memories occur nonetheless with some
degree of accuracy.
Anderson
M.C., & Levy B.J. (2009). Suppressing unwanted memories. Journal for Psychological Science, 18, 189-194.
Benoit
R.G., & Anderson M.C. (2012). Opposing mechanisms support the voluntary
forgetting of unwanted memories. Neuron,
76, 450-460.
Brewin
C.R., & Andrews B. (2017). Creating memories for false autobiographical
events in childhood: a systematic review. Applied
Cognitive Psychology, 31, 2-23.
Brewin,
C.R., & Andrews B. (2017). False memories of childhood abuse. The Psychologist, 48-52.
Finkelstein
J.D. (2017). The Ψ-files: a review of the psychological
literature regarding false memories of alien abduction. The New School Psychology Bulletin, 14, 37-44.
Geraerts
E., Lindsay S., Merckelbach H., Jelicic M., Raymaekers L., Arnold M.M., & Schooler
J.W. (2009). Cognitive mechanisms underlying recovered-memory experience of
childhood sexual abuse. Journal for
Psychological Science, 20, 92-98.
Gunawan
K., & Gerkens D.R. (2011). The recovery of blocked memories in repeated
recall tests. British Journal of
Psychology, 102, 373-391.
Kikuchi
H., Fujii T., Abe N., Suzuki M., Takagi M., Mugikura S., Takahashi S., & Mori
E. (2009). Memory repression: brain mechanisms underlying dissociative amnesia.
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22,
602-613.
McNally
R.J. (2016). False memories in the laboratory and in life: commentary on Brewin
and Andrews. Applied Cognitive Psychology,
31, 40-41.
McNally
R.J., & Geraerts E. (2009). A new solution to the recovered memory debate. Journal of the Association for Psychological
Science, 4, 126-134.
Oulton
J.M., Strange D., & Takarangi M.K.T. (2016). False memories for an analogue
trauma: does thought suppression help or hinder memory accuracy? Applied Cognitive Psychology, 30, 350-359.
Rasmussen
A.S., & Berntsen D. (2009). The possible functions of involuntary
autobiographical memories. Applied
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Sharman
S.J., & Scoboria A. (2009). Imagination equally influences false memories
of high and low plausibility events. Applied
Cognitive Psychology, 23, 813-827.
Keywords: memory, recovered memory, psychology, literature review.
Keywords: memory, recovered memory, psychology, literature review.
